During youth-led protests in New Delhi in the summer of 2026, Indian authorities did not rely solely on conventional policing. According to a report by the Lowy Institute, the government also targeted the digital infrastructure that protesters used to organise, including ordering the removal of a messaging app that works without an internet connection.
The protests, organised under the banner of the Cockroach Janata Party, initially demanded the education minister's resignation. The Lowy Institute reported that authorities suspended mobile internet services and disrupted the Delhi Metro, cutting off communication and mobility. In response, protesters turned to Bitchat, a messaging app that uses Bluetooth mesh networks to relay messages between nearby devices without requiring cellular or internet connectivity.
On 23 July 2026, the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C) sent takedown notices to GitHub, Google and Apple, demanding that Bitchat, Briar and Bridgefy be removed from their platforms within three hours, the Lowy Institute reported. The apps remained available, however. According to the Internet Freedom Foundation (IFF), cited by the Lowy Institute, the government used the wrong legal tool and issued a three-hour deadline close to midnight, leaving no realistic chance of legal recourse and failing a proportionality standard set by the Supreme Court in 2020. The notices were reportedly withdrawn once they became public.
In October 2026, when the Cockroach protests surged again, the government tried again, using different regulations to demand that Apple remove Bitchat, the Lowy Institute reported.
The Lowy Institute's analysis frames these actions as part of a broader pattern. India has recorded more than 900 internet shutdowns since 2014, with Kashmir and Manipur experiencing some of the longest restrictions on connectivity. The government introduced the Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services Rules in 2017 and replaced them in 2024, providing a legal framework for suspending telecommunications services. However, the Lowy Institute notes that the framework has done little to ensure accountability, with shutdown orders issued on vague grounds, often without being made public or subject to meaningful independent oversight.
The ease with which authorities can impose these restrictions lies partly in the centralised nature of telecommunications networks, the report explains. Mobile phones rely on cellular towers and network infrastructure operated by licensed telecom companies, which are bound under Clause 39.15 of India's Unified Licence Agreement to comply with government orders to suspend services. When authorities order a shutdown, operators can suspend connectivity across an entire area at the network level.
Mesh-based connectivity apps like Bitchat matter less as a replacement for the internet than as a challenge to the assumption that communication must depend on it, the Lowy Institute argues. They work without a SIM card, phone number, or central server; each phone becomes a node that relays messages for others, so the communication network is assembled from the devices of the crowd itself.
The Lowy Institute draws parallels to Hong Kong's pro-democracy protests in 2019, where the Bluetooth-based messaging app Bridgefy saw a sharp increase in downloads as demonstrators sought ways to communicate amid concerns about internet restrictions and surveillance. India has its own precedent: during the Citizenship Amendment Act protests in 2019, apps such as FireChat and Vojer were promoted as alternative communication tools for demonstrators in Bengaluru and elsewhere affected by internet shutdowns.
The report's author, Dr Anurag, an assistant professor in the Department of Communication & Media Studies at York University, Canada, describes the targeting of Bitchat as an intensification of what he calls 'infrastructural violence' — harm located in the withdrawal of shared systems rather than in any single act of force. He argues that infrastructure is easiest to see when it fails, because a working system recedes into the background and only reappears as a problem. 'The move from the baton to the switch needs a name, and infrastructural violence offers one,' the report states.
For university students in India and around the world, the story highlights how protest movements are adapting to state surveillance and shutdowns, and how governments are responding by targeting the technological tools themselves. It also raises questions about the limits of technological circumvention when app stores and platform companies comply with government takedown orders, and about the legal frameworks that govern such actions.