When regional leaders gathered in Manila for this week's East Asia Summit, US President Donald Trump arrived to find America's allies had been busy with one another, according to a report from the Lowy Institute's The Interpreter. In August, defence ministers from Japan and Australia gathered in Canberra in August and announced advances in virtually every area of their military partnership. Their militaries are exchanging intelligence and conducting joint training in sophisticated drills, with Japanese F-35s already operating out of Darwin. Japan is constructing Mogami-class frigates for the Royal Australian Navy, with the first vessel scheduled for delivery in 2029. The two nations have finished testing their first co-developed weapon, a high-energy laser, and are getting ready to grant Japan access to Australian testing grounds for its next-generation strike systems, including hypersonic missiles. Rotational deployments are currently in preparation.

A decade ago, much of this would have seemed far-fetched for two US allies whose security ran almost entirely through Washington, The Interpreter reported. Over the past few years, Australia and Japan have recalibrated their foreign policies to assume greater regional security roles, which signal a nascent but clear trend. The traditional "hub-and-spokes" model, with the US serving as primary guarantor through separate bilateral alliances, is gradually giving way to a middle-power-led "cross-bracing" architecture, where Canberra and Tokyo are building interconnected networks to maintain regional security and strategic balance.

Their partnership is extending outward through the use of "positive statecraft" to win the backing of smaller states. Facing seasoned hedgers who are eager to diversify foreign ties and frequently play rival powers against one another for domestic gain, Australia and Japan recognise that ideological lecturing or wielding a "big stick" is counterproductive, according to The Interpreter. Lacking the coercive weight of a true hegemon, they understand contemporary geopolitical competition runs on practical incentives. Whichever power that offers tangible buy-ins, whether through defence capacity-building or facility support, is best positioned to achieve network centrality. By providing these enticements, Australia and Japan are weaving a regional security web that is distinctively more complex, decentralised, but interconnected.

As Washington's most critical regional allies, Australia and Japan form the centre of gravity of this new architecture, beginning with their own bilateral relationship, The Interpreter noted. The convergence of their strategic interests is evidenced by the rapid expansion of high-level agreements, evolving from the 2022 Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) and upgraded Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, to the 2025 Framework for Strategic Defence Coordination (FSDC) and a new Cyber Partnership. In 2026, marking the Nara Treaty's 50th anniversary, both nations expanded alignments beyond traditional security to encompass economic security, critical minerals, and formal finance ministerial dialogues.

These high-level frameworks are already yielding deepening operational and defence-industrial integration. Both defence ministers now view each other's nation as vital to their own "strategic depth," The Interpreter reported. This sentiment is echoed by the public. A 2022 University of Sydney survey found over 60% of Australians believe a formal security treaty would make both nations safer. The 2026 Lowy Institute Poll found Japan recorded the highest ranking of trust for countries to "act responsibly in the world."

Australia and Japan represent the quintessential example of cross-bracing: two traditional spokes connecting directly, bypassing the hub, according to The Interpreter. Yet, this architecture's strength lies in its flexibility. The upgraded Joint Declaration commits Canberra and Tokyo to "consult each other on contingencies" and "consider measures in response," stopping short of a mutual defence obligation. Upholding this flexibility, the two nations have created an adaptable framework capable of attracting other countries that welcome deeper security cooperation but are hesitant to commit to a formal treaty.

The Australia-Japan partnership is actively expanding outward through implicitly synchronised diplomatic coordination, with the Philippines serving as a prime example, The Interpreter reported. Recognising the Philippines' geostrategic significance, Canberra and Tokyo have been among the most vocal Indo-Pacific countries backing Manila's 2016 South China Sea arbitral victory. Complementing this diplomatic solidarity is tangible material backing to form a strategic triangle, where Tokyo bolsters Philippine defence industries and technology, while Canberra provides training and logistical support to extend its strategic depth.

Japan's security partnership with the Philippines with the 2025 RAA enabled the countries to advance military interoperability, joint deployments, and routine bilateral naval manoeuvres in the South China Sea. In May 2026, Tokyo and Manila upgraded to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP), underpinned by Tokyo's Official Security Assistance (OSA) initiatives. In addition to pushing forward talks on military intelligence-sharing, the partnership provided key defense equipment to Manila, such as a landmark deal to hand over five decommissioned Abukuma-class destroyer escorts, plus coastal patrol boats and cutting-edge air-surveillance radar systems. Maritime collaboration between Australia and the Philippines also grew swiftly, according to The Interpreter. Following the Japan-Philippines RAA, Canberra and Manila moved quickly towards their own formalised defence arrangement. Building on regular joint patrols, growing naval and coast guard training, and a September 2026 Maritime Security Dialogue focused on marine resource protection, illegal fishing, and operational synchronisation, the two sides finalised a comprehensive new defence pact on 15 November in the run-up to the East Asia Summit. The agreement not only covers intelligence sharing, drone transfers, and maritime infrastructure, but also streamlines bilateral mechanisms for more direct and effective action.

Moreover, Australia and Japan are extending the cross-bracing network to regional swing states, as evidenced by their overlapping defence diplomacy milestones, The Interpreter reported. The February 2026 Australia-Indonesia Treaty on Common Security (the Jakarta Treaty) elevated bilateral ties to unprecedented levels, quickly followed by the Defence Cooperation Arrangement between Jakarta and Tokyo in May. Similarly, Japan and Vietnam convened their inaugural Foreign and Defence Vice-Ministerial 2+2 dialogue in December 2025, with Australia establishing a parallel dialogue with Hanoi months later. These consecutive agreements demonstrate Tokyo and Canberra's capability to strengthen regional security cooperation independently of US participation.

While these cross-bracing arrangements aim to provide strategic ballast for Southeast Asia, they uphold the principle of host-country agency, according to The Interpreter. As illustrated by the inaugural Japan–Australia–Indonesia trilateral dialogue in August, Australia sought to deepen interoperability and joint training as part of the Jakarta Treaty commitments, while Japan focused on facilitating its OSA program and defence transfers. These efforts aim to enable Indonesia's defence capability without relying on a single power. Yet, as Indonesia's Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin maintained, any defence proposals are assessed strictly against Jakarta's national interests. Australia's Defence Minister Marles reinforced this by emphasising the joint training facility on Morotai entirely under Jakarta's control. This position reflects Foreign Minister Penny Wong's vision of cultivating a "strategic equilibrium" where no country dominates or is dominated. Cross-bracing serves as the practical expression of this aim, empowering regional states to control their strategic destiny.

To be sure, perspectives on this partnership vary, The Interpreter reported. While Japanese observers framed the trilateral meeting as an effort to draw Jakarta closer amid Chinese maritime pressure, others characterised Indonesia's participation as a move of "strategic convenience", particularly as it simultaneously deepens military ties with Beijing. Yet, it is precisely this pragmatic acceptance of swing states' hedging positions that allows cross-bracing to expand.

Distinct from the flexible cross-bracing emerging in Southeast Asia, the Pacific's evolving security architecture more closely resembles a hub-and-spoke system centred on Australia, according to The Interpreter. While rooted in geography and history, this shift was accelerated by the 2022 Solomon Islands–China security agreement, that alerted Australian officials that China might station security personnel in an area Australia views as its primary strategic concern. Starting in 2023, Australia has entered treaty-level pacts with Tuvalu, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, and Fiji. The agreements with PNG and Fiji include mutual defense commitments, marking a clear shift away from the non-alliance balancing common in Southeast Asia. For Australia, these arrangements are essential to assist a region where most nations lack sufficient self-defense capabilities, The Interpreter reported. Australia's commitments span military supplies, budget support, and extensive police and military training. To integrate regional forces, Australia is developing a pathway for PNG citizens to enlist in the Australian Defence Force, with a pilot expected in 2027. Similarly, Fiji's companion Vuvale Union adds the Pacific Australia Skills program to existing Australian support for the Blackrock peacekeeping hub. For states with minimal or no defence forces, the commitments reach into domestic governance. Tuvalu's Falepili Union, for instance, commits Australia to support climate mobility pathways, disaster assistance, and infrastructure funding. Meanwhile, Nauru receives substantial budget and policing funds, and Vanuatu's Nakamal Agreement makes similar provisions.