Papua New Guinea’s Prime Minister James Marape told Chinese President Xi Jinping last week that closing Taiwan’s representative office in Port Moresby was a politically difficult decision, but expressed “hope this assists you in your efforts for reunification”, according to a report by the Lowy Institute’s The Interpreter.

The remarks, made in Shenzhen ahead of the APEC Summit, stand out because Marape appears to have gone further than previous PNG leaders by explicitly endorsing reunification, rather than merely adhering to the One China policy. Successive PNG governments have generally avoided taking direct positions on how the dispute between Beijing and Taipei should be resolved, the article notes.

Marape’s statement may reflect an effort to reassure Beijing following PNG’s recent security agreements with Australia and the United States — the 2023 Defence Cooperation Agreement with Washington and the 2025 Pukpuk Treaty with Canberra. These pacts may have left Beijing fearing that PNG was drifting into the Western security architecture, according to the analysis by Michael Kabuni, a lecturer in political science at the University of Papua New Guinea.

For students of international relations and Pacific affairs, the episode illustrates the difficulties small states face in maintaining an independent foreign policy while engaging with competing powers. It also shows that security agreements do not guarantee broader foreign policy alignment — a lesson for Canberra and Washington.

Going beyond the One China policy

PNG recognised Beijing in 1976, apart from a brief switch to Taiwan in 1999. But recognising Beijing’s government is different from explicitly backing reunification. Marape may be the first PNG prime minister to publicly endorse reunification in such direct terms, The Interpreter reports.

One possible explanation for this position is PNG’s growing economic relationship with China, including infrastructure financing, market access, investment and development assistance. In the meeting, Marape urged Chinese companies to invest in downstream processing.

But closing Taiwan’s office also carries economic costs. Taiwan announced that it would stop purchasing PNG’s liquefied natural gas (LNG). Last year, Taiwan had imported 1.8 million tonnes of PNG LNG worth about $800 million, according to the report.

Xi acknowledged PNG’s position, praising Marape for having “firmly adhered to the ‘one China’ principle”.

The challenges from within

Marape’s admission that closing Taiwan’s office was politically difficult was equally interesting. He told Xi: “I faced challenges from within, because we also relate to many nations, but we were resolved.”

Public opinion was probably not the main obstacle: foreign policy rarely features in PNG’s domestic debates, which are dominated by employment, inflation, public services and law and order, while China and Taiwan remain the preserve of a small urban, political and academic elite, the article notes.

Marape may instead have been referring to resistance within government, the bureaucracy or PNG’s security establishment — or indirectly acknowledging concerns from the United States. The US State Department described Taiwan’s office closure as “yet another example of Beijing’s intimidation campaign against Taiwan”.

Although there is no direct evidence Canberra opposed the move, Marape would have been aware of its concerns. His reference to PNG’s relationships with “many nations” may have been deliberately ambiguous, allowing him to demonstrate political commitment to Beijing without identifying those who may have opposed the decision.

Why PNG cannot walk away from China

China remains an economic partner PNG cannot easily abandon — and neither Australia’s development aid nor the United States’ expanded security role gives either country real leverage to change that, according to the analysis.

China provides infrastructure financing, investment, construction services and access to markets. Chinese state-owned firms lead the infrastructure field, carrying out work funded by multilateral lenders like the Asian Development Bank. Thus, China's economic footprint goes beyond projects paid for directly by Beijing. In PNG politics, visible assets such as roads and bridges hold particular significance, enabling politicians to show they are fulfilling promises to their voters. The Connect PNG road program exemplifies how infrastructure development ties into political appeal. This road network is intended to connect 13 economic corridors and provinces not previously linked by roads. This year, Marape headed a 100-vehicle convoy traveling more than 830 kilometers from Port Moresby to Morobe Province, along a route now called Pangu Highway — named after his political party — which was mostly constructed by Chinese firms. Additionally, Chinese funding can attract PNG leaders because it is often seen as carrying fewer political and governance strings compared to traditional Western aid, though loans still come with repayment duties and financial hazards. For leaders grappling with huge development hurdles and tight budgets, such opportunities are hard to pass up.

Balancing act

PNG’s longstanding foreign policy of “friends to all, enemies to none” allows the country to keep ties with rival states. While Marape has offered various iterations of this strategy, his latest moves indicate the core idea persists. For Australia and the United States, the takeaway is that defense pacts do not ensure wider diplomatic unity. For PNG, the question is whether it can sustain this equilibrium as geopolitical rivalry grows.