According to an analysis by Mark Beeson published by the Lowy Institute's The Interpreter, the 33rd APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, set for 18-19 November in Shenzhen, China, is drawing unusual attention not for its official agenda of trade and investment liberalisation, but because it will host a first-ever trilateral meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping, US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the main forum.

Beeson, an adjunct professor at the University of Technology Sydney and Griffith University, argues that this development underscores a fundamental shift in the forum's dynamics. While APEC was originally conceived by its Australian architects, including former Prime Minister Paul Keating, as a vehicle for managing regional tensions and fostering inclusive economic cooperation among a broad range of Asia-Pacific economies, the reality is that the forum's most consequential function has become providing a venue for great-power summitry.

"The prospect of the 'great powers' getting together to make deals over the heads of the region's lesser lights is not how things were supposed to develop," Beeson writes, drawing on James Curran's book Grand Ambition. He notes that Keating's vision for APEC was focused on the "big picture" of managing regional tensions, but that Australia is now unlikely to play a major role or receive credit for any outcomes.

Beeson attributes this shift not to any failure by Keating or APEC itself, but to a broader inability of multilateral organisations like APEC and the United Nations to become more inclusive forums where a wider range of voices can be heard. He suggests that "realist" perspectives, which hold that power is the only currency that matters in international affairs, may explain the current dynamic, but he also argues that the world faces unprecedented threats—such as environmental breakdown—that require widespread cooperation and collective action, making APEC's original goal of encouraging less regulated economic integration seem anachronistic.

One area where Beeson sees potential for useful cooperation among APEC's mainly middle-power membership is artificial intelligence. He notes that AI featured in the Gyeongju Declaration from APEC's 2025 summit in South Korea, which recognised both the economic benefits of AI and its significant and differing impacts on the Asia-Pacific labour force and energy demand. Beeson warns that the AI bubble may burst, potentially plunging the region into another economic crisis, and that AI poses a direct threat to lives and livelihoods. However, he observes that APEC lacks the mandate and capacity to deal with the perverse effects of unconstrained economic or technological development.

Despite these limitations, Beeson argues that the very act of providing a forum where Xi and Trump can meet and discuss AI is potentially invaluable, given the intense competition between the world's superpowers for technological leadership. He suggests that the chances of reaching agreement on the future course of AI development are not good, given the stakes and lack of trust, but are better than the prospects for developing a common understanding on climate change action.

On climate, Beeson notes that Xi has an "incomparably better record" than Trump, and that the APEC summit provides an opportunity to highlight what he calls enlightened environmental leadership. He expresses disappointment that middle powers like Australia have not used their positions to encourage the great powers to think about the general interest, pointing to Australia's leadership at the COP31 climate talks in Antalya as evidence.

Beeson concludes by reflecting on the gap between organising an international forum and generating transformative outcomes that make a difference to people's lives. He notes that while Keating had grand ambitions for APEC, it is now China—not an original member—that may be the best hope for making progress on complex issues requiring international cooperation. "Xi also has grand ambitions," Beeson writes. "We must hope he uses the summit to put the collective interest ahead of the national variety."

For university students, the analysis highlights how the global governance architecture that shapes their future—from trade and technology to climate and AI—is increasingly driven by great-power dynamics rather than inclusive multilateralism. The diminished role of middle powers like Australia means that students studying international relations, economics, or environmental policy may find fewer opportunities for their countries to shape outcomes on issues that directly affect their careers and studies, from job markets disrupted by AI to climate policies that influence campus sustainability initiatives and research funding.