According to a detailed analysis published by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the United States faces a deeper problem than a lack of capital in its effort to break China's near-monopoly on rare-earth elements: a lack of sustained political and market commitment. The piece, authored by four CFR term members with backgrounds in finance, corporate development, and China risk advisory, argues that while the Pentagon's Office of Strategic Capital has been allocated hundreds of billions in loan authority, industry fundamentals remain unprofitable, and a future Congress could easily reverse today's policies.
The authors point to a concrete example of the vulnerability: in May 2025, Ford halted its Chicago-based Explorer assembly line for a week not because of a strike or equipment failure, but because China's new licensing regime for rare-earth magnets—components costing only a few dollars each—disrupted production of a $40,000 vehicle. The incident illustrates how a small, concentrated chokepoint can paralyze a much larger industrial operation.
Washington has responded with significant financial commitments. The Pentagon's Office of Strategic Capital, established under President Joe Biden, received $200 billion in loan authority under President Donald Trump's One Big Beautiful Bill Act, with $100 billion specifically earmarked for critical minerals. The CFR analysis notes that a steady stream of deals shows the office is successfully distributing funds. However, the authors argue that capital is "the easy part."
The core challenge, they write, is what game theorists call a commitment problem. Rebuilding a rare-earth supply chain can take a decade or more and requires consistent government support, but today's Congress cannot bind tomorrow's. Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist Party understands that its near-monopoly position allows it to make the same material worthless or priceless on command, giving it leverage over rivals.
A Pentagon rule set to take effect on January 1, 2027, would bar rare-earth magnets with any Chinese content from defense supply chains. The CFR analysis reports that major defense contractors have already pushed for delays and waivers because no Western source can meet their needs. The authors note that private investors are fundamentally uninterested in funding these projects because they are unprofitable and complex relative to other opportunities, and relying solely on government funding risks political instability given one-year budget and two-year electoral cycles.
To solve this, the authors propose creating a "counter-constituency" that will advocate for a domestic supply chain regardless of who is in office. They outline three mechanisms to build one.
First, the government could help create a market where none exists. Currently, rare-earth prices vary widely by compound, purity, and source, with no global benchmark like West Texas Intermediate for oil. The authors suggest borrowing a model from health care: group purchasing organizations (GPOs) that aggregate demand and bargain collectively. The government could contract with an existing company or charter a new organization, paired with the Defense Logistics Agency's bulk procurement experience. Pooling demand would create a reliable demand signal and price discovery, making projects bankable for investors. The authors note that legal authority and operational precedent exist under Section 708 of the Defense Production Act, which the Department of Energy has already used to bring nearly 100 nuclear fuel companies into a consortium.
Second, the government could incentivize companies to coinvest their own capital. Currently, in deals like the one with MP Materials, the government allocates offtake through a waterfall system—defense primes first, then the broader defense industrial base, then other U.S. companies, then allies, then others—giving access away without asking for anything in return. The authors propose a contingent convertible financing mechanism paired with an offtake commitment and a price floor, reserving a share of the offtake for strategic coinvestors who put capital into the project alongside the government. They cite Japan's response to China's 2010 rare-earth chokepoint against Japan during a maritime dispute: a Japanese consortium invested $250 million into Australia's Lynas mining company in return for priority access to offtake, reducing Japan's reliance on China for rare-earth elements from 90 to 60 percent.
Third, the government should track its investments across the whole of government, not agency by agency, so that the program's aggregate record is easy to point to. The authors reference the 2011 bankruptcy of Solyndra, a solar company backed by $528 million in taxpayer-funded loans, which led to political hearings and a lingering "Solyndra fear" that still hampers policy. They argue that isolated failures should not imperil an entire policy; a simple scorecard showing wins offsetting losses would give supporters data to advocate for continuing the effort.
The authors caution that a lobby can also outstay its welcome, and programs should have built-in sunsets tied to output targets and performance, not fixed end dates, which would only tell Beijing how long to wait. They conclude that Beijing's rare-earth chokepoint is a bet on American political dysfunction, and the surest way to make Beijing lose that bet is to give American business constituencies a stake in proving it wrong.