When Donald Trump and Xi Jinping sit down on the sidelines of the APEC summit later this week, artificial intelligence is expected to dominate the conversation. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has indicated that Washington hopes to use the talks to launch a new bilateral dialogue on AI, according to the Lowy Institute. But Bessent also cautioned that both sides should “harbour no illusions” about their differences — they remain competitors in the race for AI supremacy.

A recent Lowy Institute paper, the Asia Power Snapshot, found that the United States holds a clear advantage in the capabilities of its frontier AI models, driven largely by its dominance in computing power. To protect that edge, Washington has imposed export controls aimed at limiting China’s access to the most advanced semiconductor technologies. Yet, as the Lowy Institute reports, Beijing continues to search for ways around those restrictions.

The resignation of former Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, who stepped down after admitting to an affair, has drawn renewed attention to Chinese efforts to bypass US controls. The woman involved is reportedly a former executive of Megaspeed, one of Nvidia’s largest foreign customers. According to The New York Times, US officials concluded she was a Chinese intelligence asset — a claim Beijing rejects. Megaspeed itself has faced scrutiny over alleged export violations, which it denies.

Observers have long suspected that advanced chips are smuggled to China through Southeast Asia. In March 2026, US prosecutors charged a co-founder of server maker Super Micro with conspiring to divert servers containing Nvidia chips, alleging the scheme involved roughly US$2.5 billion worth of AI technology destined for China. In October 2026, Malaysian customs seized servers containing about US$12 million worth of AI chips at Kuala Lumpur’s international airport.

China has also looked to outsource its computing needs abroad. The New York Times reported that Megaspeed has used Nvidia chips in data centres across Malaysia and Indonesia that appear to serve Chinese interests. Separately, INF Tech, a Chinese AI startup, has accessed restricted chips by renting them from an Indonesian firm.

Washington has tried to close these loopholes. It has pressured Southeast Asian countries like Malaysia to tighten their regulations, and Congress is advancing legislation to address the gaps. In January 2026, the US House of Representatives passed the Remote Access Security Act, which would extend export controls to cloud-based access to restricted chips. The Senate has not yet voted on it. In March, a House committee passed the Chip Security Act, which would require advanced chips to carry on-chip mechanisms to verify their location and detect tampering. In May 2026, the US Department of Commerce moved to block sales of advanced chips to subsidiaries of Chinese companies based outside China.

However, some of these measures have faced pushback. The Semiconductor Industry Association, which represents chipmakers including Nvidia, has opposed the Chip Security Act, arguing that it cannot support “blanket mandates” for on-chip mechanisms it considers untested and potentially infeasible.

Even if these bills pass, controls alone may not be enough, as Chinese firms have also sought to innovate their way around restrictions. One major barrier Chinese companies face is limited access to advanced lithography equipment, which is necessary for shrinking transistors — a key component of semiconductors. Dutch company ASML, which makes these machines, has curbed sales to China under pressure from Washington. Adding more transistors to a chip increases its processing speed and computing power.

In May 2026, Huawei announced a new chip-design approach that aims to increase transistor density without shrinking transistors. The company hopes to match, by 2031, the transistor density of the chips Taiwan’s TSMC plans to produce in 2028 — potentially without needing the advanced lithography machines that Chinese firms struggle to obtain.

For university students, particularly those studying computer science, engineering, or international relations, this rivalry has direct implications. US export controls and Chinese countermeasures are reshaping global supply chains, affecting everything from the availability of high-end hardware for research to the job market for AI talent. Students planning careers in semiconductor design, AI development, or tech policy should watch how these dynamics evolve, as they could influence where research funding flows, which technologies are accessible, and which skills are most in demand.

As the Lowy Institute concludes, however the APEC summit talks go, Washington will need to remain vigilant to stay ahead in the AI race.