President Donald Trump is set to travel to Asia from November 16 to 19 for the U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit in Manila and the APEC leaders' summit in Shenzhen, where he will also meet with Chinese leader Xi Jinping and possibly Russian President Vladimir Putin. According to the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the trip comes with an ambitious agenda but faces significant headwinds, as Trump's second-term Asia policy—marked by tariffs on allies and reduced defense support—has been broadly unpopular across the region.

The White House's goals include securing regional support for "Pax Silica," a U.S.-led coalition aimed at coordinating export controls and investment monitoring on chips, artificial intelligence (AI), critical minerals, and data centers. CFR reports that while not openly stated as such, Pax Silica is effectively an effort to prevent China from obtaining advanced chips or developing cutting-edge AI models. The administration may also push Southeast Asian states to commit to buying entire AI stacks from U.S. suppliers, and could announce new trade framework deals with Vietnam and possibly Thailand.

In meetings with Xi, Trump will seek promises on establishing a hotline on AI issues—already agreed to but not yet implemented—and extending the bilateral trade truce and a truce on rare-earth exports. A trilateral Trump-Xi-Putin summit on the sidelines of APEC, covering the Iran war, Ukraine, and other issues, remains a possibility.

However, CFR argues that the trip is unlikely to yield major gains. Cooperation on Pax Silica may be difficult given turmoil at U.S. AI companies like Nvidia, the White House's previously blasé attitude toward AI regulation, and the growing role of Chinese companies in building data centers and cloud computing in places like Malaysia. Five Southeast Asian states have already joined the China-led World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization, a rival multilateral body. Convincing regional states to buy the full U.S. AI stack will be challenging, as China's open AI models are cheaper and already attracting customers worldwide. CFR notes that China's Kimi K3 is about 40 percent cheaper than top American AI models and nearly matches their capability, and that companies like Airbnb, Coinbase, and DoorDash are reportedly using Chinese models.

Even if Trump meets with Xi and Putin, he will soon face a different Congress after the midterms, one that would likely oppose such a trilateral summit and any results from it. CFR reports that working with Xi and Putin is unpopular among both Democrats and many Republican lawmakers, who may be less inhibited in Trump's last two years and remain strong supporters of Ukraine in the Russia-Ukraine war. The American public also views Russia unfavorably, with 85 percent holding a negative opinion. Taiwan enjoys significant bipartisan congressional support, and according to several congressional staffers cited by CFR, there may be enough support to push through an already-appropriated $14 billion arms sale to the island, even overriding a possible veto by Trump, regardless of what he tells Xi in Shenzhen.

Trade deals with Thailand and Vietnam, if announced, are likely to remain frameworks. CFR notes that Southeast Asia has little reason to trust the White House will follow through, given that a deal with Malaysia from last year has not yet taken effect, nor has a potential deal with Indonesia. Vietnam believes it has already promised as much as it can in negotiations and is being pushed for more, according to Vietnamese officials who spoke with CFR. Trump's retention of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and choice of hard-liner Stephen Miller as chief of staff signals no policy course change after the midterms, making Asian leaders even warier. Asian leaders know Trump retains authority to set tariff policy, which is difficult for Congress or courts to stop in the short term.

Any "wins" from the meeting with Xi are likely modest. Even if the export control truce is extended, China is still stalling on allowing rare earths out of the country, leaving the United States desperately short of these materials and looking in unlikely places like Myanmar. Xi knows Beijing has leverage on rare earths, the Iran war, and other exports, and will likely push Trump to make clearer statements against Taiwanese independence. Trump, who has taken a soft approach toward China in the past year, could agree, CFR reports. Trump has already delayed the $14 billion arms sale to Taiwan and treated the island as a bargaining chip.

In the South China Sea, China has stepped up aggressive actions in the past two months, including buzzing Philippine aircraft with fighter jets, ramming Philippine boats, and preventing resupply of Philippine forces at Second Thomas Shoal. Regional states like the Philippines will look for clearer U.S. security guarantees, which they are unlikely to get as the U.S. focuses on the Middle East and Western Hemisphere. CFR notes that even Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the most pro-U.S. leader in Southeast Asia, has become bitterly disappointed with what he has received in return for his backing. The White House has reduced freedom of navigation patrols in the South China Sea from prior administration levels and is unlikely to promise increases. Marcos Jr. may get vague reassurances but not the Foreign Military Financing aid he wants, and has already begun a shift toward China.

In Northeast Asia, U.S. allies are so alienated that Trump is unlikely to convince them of U.S. reliability as a defense partner. Japan and South Korea, disappointed by the first two years of the Trump administration and watching the congressional change, could use the meetings to walk back promises to invest in the United States, such as a possible South Korean investment in an Alaska gas deal, adding to Trump's potential woes.