The incoming Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, set to take office in January 2027, face a formidable challenge in their quest to roll back President Donald Trump's tariffs. According to a November 16 analysis by the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE), while the tariffs are deeply unpopular, the path to repeal is blocked by the near-certainty of a presidential veto and the difficulty of gathering the two-thirds majorities needed to override it.

As of November 16, the Associated Press reported that Democrats will hold at least 256 House seats and 55 Senate seats (including two independents who caucus with them). These are solid majorities, but they fall short of the 290 House votes and 67 Senate votes required to override a veto. PIIE notes that Congress has overridden only 112 of the 2,599 presidential vetoes issued since 1789, underscoring the rarity of such an outcome.

Trump, whose term extends into January 2029, has made tariffs a hallmark of his administration. PIIE senior research staff member Alan Wm. Wolff writes that the president "likes tariffs" and "believes in the correctness of his tariffs," making his signature on any repeal bill "about zero."

Legislative options

The new congressional majorities have several tools at their disposal, according to the analysis. One approach is to attach a blanket repeal of Trump's tariffs to a must-pass bill like the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Alternatively, Democrats could offer a standalone bill, expecting a veto but forcing Trump and his congressional supporters to publicly own the tariffs' costs to consumers and small businesses.

A third, more targeted option is to focus on lifting the most recent anti-Canada tariffs by repealing Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the statute on which they are based. PIIE notes that this 1930 statute is "no longer in force anyway," and the tariffs against Canada—a close neighbor and ally—are "particularly unpopular" and harmful to US businesses. However, these tariffs apply to only about $20 billion of US imports, a small fraction of the total.

More damaging from Canada's perspective are the tariffs imposed under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which target Canadian steel, aluminum, lumber, copper, auto parts, and other goods on purported national security grounds. These goods were not exempted under the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), and PIIE reports that the US collected $10 billion in duties on Canadian imports in 2025. One legislative fix would be to exempt Canada from Section 232 duties, but Trump's animus toward Canada—he has referred to it as the "51st US state"—makes a veto of such a measure likely.

Broader challenges

A broader anti-tariff bill that forbids the use of trade statutes for economic coercion against allies or neutral countries would face at least three problems, according to PIIE. First, defining "ally" and "neutral country" would involve contentious political judgments. Second, it would effectively end Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, a tool used by multiple administrations to threaten tariffs in response to unfair foreign trade practices. Third, vested interests that welcome protection would oppose the bill.

Tariffs on Chinese goods account for the largest share of US tariffs under both the Trump and Biden administrations. A bill that takes a more rational approach—excluding goods that are a net benefit to the US economy—might attract votes from the farm belt if it reopened the Chinese market to US agricultural exports. But PIIE warns that appearing weak on China could be politically costly, and a China-focused bill is "not at all likely" to get enough votes to override a veto.

Leverage and cooperation

Despite the obstacles, Congress does have some leverage. Senate confirmation is required for senior administration appointments and federal judges, and appropriations bills must be passed into law. The Trump administration may need occasional congressional support or forbearance, which can be used as bargaining chips. However, PIIE notes that members of the incoming Congress have more than tariff reform on their wish lists, and they will have to use their leverage selectively.

The analysis also points to the possibility of cooperation between the executive and legislative branches. Under the Constitution, only the president can negotiate trade agreements, while only Congress can implement changes in US law. The Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), which facilitated interbranch cooperation from 1975 to 2021, expired in July 2021 and was not renewed by either Trump or his predecessor. PIIE suggests that the next president, regardless of party, could discover the merits of working with Congress on trade.

What this means for students

For university students, the outcome of this legislative battle has direct implications for the cost of living. The AP Voter Poll found that nearly 50 percent of respondents said the cost of living was crucial to their vote for Congress. PIIE states that the tariffs "fed inflation, making life in this country less affordable." If Congress succeeds in rolling back tariffs, students could see lower prices on a range of imported goods, from electronics to clothing. Conversely, a stalemate means continued upward pressure on consumer prices, affecting budgets for tuition, rent, and everyday expenses. Students studying economics, political science, or international relations may also find this a live case study in the interplay between trade policy, legislative procedure, and electoral politics.