A proposed rule from the US Office of Management and Budget, set to take effect this December, would prohibit all federal funding for scientific research collaboration with China. The measure has sparked a heated debate among policy experts about whether cutting ties protects national security or undermines American scientific competitiveness.

In a written exchange published by the Brookings Institution, five experts with contrasting views laid out their arguments. While they agree on the need to protect sensitive research and attract scientific talent, they diverge sharply on how to balance security concerns with the benefits of international collaboration.

The case for openness

Kyle Chan, a fellow at Brookings' John L. Thornton China Center, argued that closing off collaboration would not hinder China's scientific progress but would isolate the United States. He noted that Chinese institutions now account for over a third of the world's top 500 academic research institutions in the 2026 Nature Index, and that China is at the global frontier in fields like renewable energy, nanotechnology, and genomics. In the first half of 2026 alone, global pharmaceutical firms signed $110 billion in licensing deals for Chinese biotech innovations, according to Chan.

Chan emphasized that scientific research is increasingly international: in 2024, 41% of American science and engineering publications involved international collaboration, with China as America's largest research partner. Excluding Chinese institutions from these networks, he warned, could leave US researchers isolated while the rest of the world continues working together.

Yingyi Ma, a nonresident senior fellow at Brookings, echoed this view, calling openness America's most unique competitive advantage. She pointed out that China has surpassed the US as the world's largest investor in and producer of science and engineering research, and that collaboration with such a research power makes the US stronger. Ma also highlighted the talent dimension: China produces more PhDs than any other country, and by several accounts, more top AI talent. However, she noted that years of suspicion toward Chinese scientists have weakened America's ability to attract that talent. The share of Chinese-origin top AI researchers working in China rose from 57% in 2022 to 69% in 2025, according to Ma.

The case for restriction

Jacqueline Deal, a nonresident senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, argued that the question should be reframed: how can the US protect its eroding capacity for innovation in the face of what she described as Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policies to exploit the American research establishment for asymmetric gains? She contended that decades of welcoming Chinese STEM students have left the US dependent on Chinese nationals to staff its labs, giving the CCP leverage through its surveillance and coercion of Chinese citizens abroad.

Deal cited a bipartisan 2019 Senate investigative report that found some Chinese students entered the US through non-merit-based talent program channels, including contracts that compelled participants to recruit additional students to work for them in the US. She also pointed to research by the US House China Select Committee, which examined two years of publications on dual-use topics supported by over $9 billion in Pentagon and Department of Energy awards. In roughly half the cases, the PRC-based coauthors worked directly for China's defense research industrial base, according to Deal. A follow-on study found at least $943.5 million in federal research grants shared since 2019 with coauthors at PRC defense labs.

Deal argued that this arrangement allows Beijing to prioritize investments in both military and commercial applications, reducing revenue for US firms facing subsidized Chinese competitors. To recover its capacity for innovation, she called for rebuilding a non-PRC STEM talent pipeline, passing the Securing Innovation and Research from Adversaries (SIRA) Act, outlawing all PRC-sponsored talent recruitment programs, and increasing scholarships for US and trusted foreign students.

A middle ground

Miles Yu, senior fellow and director of the China Center at the Hudson Institute, and Ryan Hass, director of Brookings' John L. Thornton China Center, contributed perspectives that sought to balance openness and restriction. Hass, who also holds the Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies, emphasized the importance of protecting sensitive research while maintaining collaboration in non-sensitive fields. Yu argued for a targeted approach that distinguishes between basic and applied research, and between sensitive and non-sensitive fields.

The contributors broadly agreed on the need to safeguard sensitive research and attract scientific talent, but disagreed on whether existing safeguards at universities and federal research funding agencies are effective. The debate underscores a fundamental tension: how to protect national security without undermining the scientific openness that has long been a source of American strength.

For university students, the outcome of this debate could have direct implications. A blanket ban on collaboration with China would affect the many US researchers who work with Chinese counterparts, potentially limiting access to cutting-edge research and funding. It could also reshape the landscape for international students and postdoctoral fellows, particularly those from China, who play a significant role in US labs. As the December deadline approaches, the debate is likely to intensify, with implications for the future of global scientific collaboration.