According to a Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) analysis published November 18, 2026, China has increasingly weaponized its control over vital materials, technologies, and goods to pressure other nations. The report, authored by CFR Senior Vice President Shannon K. O'Neil, argues that while Western market-based economies cannot match Beijing's grip on supply chains, they could compete by uniting their consumer power.
O'Neil traces China's use of export controls as a coercive tool back to 2010, when Beijing curtailed rare earth exports to Japan following the arrest of a Chinese sea captain. More recently, after the US raised tariffs, China disrupted global car and semiconductor manufacturing by restricting exports of rare earths and permanent magnets, reportedly forcing the Trump administration to back down. China has also blacklisted precision manufacturing, electric motor, aerospace, and defense companies on "dual use" grounds, and is proposing new licensing regimes for solar, AI, and mineral refining technologies.
The US has attempted similar tactics, restricting exports of software and chips to Chinese companies like Huawei since 2019, and banning the export of leading-edge semiconductors and manufacturing equipment to China in 2022. However, O'Neil notes that the US is "outmatched by the breadth of manufacturing chokepoints China holds" and that prohibiting private companies from selling abroad "sits uneasily with America's market-based fundamentals."
Unilateral US demand-side measures—barring Chinese telecom gear, connected vehicles, and imposing broad tariffs—have not stopped Huawei from becoming the world's largest telecom equipment maker, BYD the biggest EV manufacturer, or Chinese exports from reaching record levels. The CFR analysis points out that US purchases account for only one-third of global consumption, insufficient to unilaterally change China's economic behavior, as Chinese firms can redirect products to other markets.
O'Neil proposes a "buyers' club" of major market-based economies. If the US joined with Europe, Japan, South Korea, Canada, and Australia, they would collectively represent more than half of global consumption. Adding Brazil, Mexico, India, the UK, and Argentina would push that share to two-thirds. Such a coalition could close off markets to Chinese firms exporting at below-cost prices, offset inflationary effects by maintaining economies of scale through rerouted supply chains, and provide safety in numbers against Chinese retaliation.
The CFR report notes a nascent structure emerged on September 30 in Milwaukee, where the US, EU, Japan, South Korea, and two dozen other nations signed a framework to investigate global steel overcapacity—China produces roughly half of all steel, and its capacity is projected to grow. A narrower coalition including India, Mexico, and the EU followed with a separate statement targeting cars, batteries, chemicals, legacy semiconductors, and solar panels.
O'Neil acknowledges these initial agreements "lack teeth" but suggests countries could add binding enforcement mechanisms such as coordinated tariffs, quotas, or import bans, and facilitate investment and subsidy matching among members. The analysis concludes that China's willingness to strike a deal with Europe on car imports reflects its desire to avoid more coordinated pushback, though the cap agreed was higher than last year's overall imports, making it favorable to Beijing.
"In the weaponizing of production, the US today can't beat Shenzhen," O'Neil writes. "But working together, the world's market-based economies could blunt it."