According to a Brookings Institution analysis by senior fellow Patricia M. Kim, the upcoming trilateral meeting among U.S. President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Shenzhen is unlikely to produce major breakthroughs. Instead, Kim argues, the gathering may underscore how far Washington's position in the strategic triangle has eroded since the 1970s.

Kim, a senior fellow in the John L. Thornton China Center and the Center for Asia Policy Studies, writes that during the Cold War, Washington occupied a pivotal position between Beijing and Moscow. Both China and the Soviet Union had strong incentives to seek better relations with the United States, giving American leaders leverage. Today, that dynamic has reversed: China and Russia have forged a close strategic partnership rooted in shared grievances and a common desire to challenge what they perceive as a Western-dominated international order, limiting Washington's ability to exploit differences between them.

Kim notes that the logic of triangular diplomacy was effective in part because Beijing found Washington appealing not only for what the U.S. could offer bilaterally, but also because of Washington's central position in the international system and the influence it exercised through its network of alliances and partnerships. The Nixon administration understood that rapprochement with China would provide leverage with Moscow, leading to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in 1972.

Today, however, China is no longer the isolated country it was during the Cold War. Kim writes in her forthcoming book, "No Constraints: China's Global Quest for Partners and Influence," that Beijing now has an extensive network of strategic partners. Russia has also cultivated alternative markets and partnerships to mitigate Western sanctions and isolation.

Kim argues that the United States is not without leverage. China's economy remains reliant on American markets, technology, and financial networks, and Beijing has reasons to avoid a destabilizing confrontation with Washington. Moscow has shown little interest in winding down its war against Ukraine, but U.S. and European military assistance and diplomatic support for Kyiv remain critical to the war's progression, and Western sanctions continue to squeeze Russia's long-term economic prospects.

However, Kim contends that the Trump administration is working against itself. Its transactional approach to allies, statements casting doubt on U.S. commitments to their defense, and willingness to impose tariffs on friends and rivals alike have diminished Washington's ability to marshal collective strength toward common objectives. This has positioned the U.S. as a less attractive negotiating partner, according to Kim.

Kim also points to Trump's eagerness to secure diplomatic breakthroughs with Xi and Putin as further eroding Washington's leverage. She notes that Trump has turned the screws on Ukraine and eased sanctions on Moscow without securing corresponding concessions from Putin. While touting his personal relationship with Xi and focusing on sector-specific wins such as China's promises to purchase U.S. agricultural products and Boeing jets, Beijing has been given a pass on addressing long-standing structural economic disputes, Kim writes. Questioning U.S. commitments to Taiwan and suggesting that U.S. arms sales could be on the table during negotiations have further weakened American credibility and bargaining power.

Against this backdrop, Kim argues that a trilateral summit in Shenzhen would offer strikingly unequal benefits. For Xi, hosting the meeting would represent a diplomatic victory, reinforcing Beijing's image as a peacemaker and indispensable center of global diplomacy. For Putin, simply appearing alongside Trump and Xi would elevate his international standing and ease Moscow's diplomatic isolation without having made a single meaningful concession on the war in Ukraine. For Trump, the gathering would offer a historic encounter, but Kim questions what the United States would gain.

Trump and the White House have suggested that a trilateral summit could make progress on nuclear arms control. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the last remaining U.S.-Russia strategic arms-control agreement, expired earlier this year, and China is in the middle of an unprecedented nuclear buildup. Kim acknowledges that reviving arms control discussions would support U.S. interests, but she argues that successful negotiations require a strong strategic position and thorough working-level preparations. She finds it difficult to see how a last-minute summit stage-managed by Beijing will set a solid foundation for the kind of breakthrough Trump is seeking.

Kim concludes that while the trilateral in Shenzhen will surely be historic, instead of restoring the image of American power and preeminence evident during the Cold War, the meeting may only reveal how far Washington's position has eroded since the triangular diplomacy of the 1970s.