Sending police officers to work in other countries raises a fundamental question that the Pacific region is now confronting: who is legally responsible when those officers exercise public authority beyond their own borders?
The endorsement of the Constitution of the Pacific Community of Policing (PACPOL) on 14 October 2026, as reported by The Interpreter, brings together the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police (PICP) and the Pacific Policing Initiative (PPI) under a single, Pacific-led framework. But according to Nasser Zakr, a lawyer specialising in international law and human rights writing for the Lowy Institute's The Interpreter, institutional unity alone does not resolve questions of command, jurisdiction or accountability.
The Pacific already has relevant examples. The 2017 Agreement between Australia and Solomon Islands concerning the deployment of police, armed forces and other personnel, signed on 14 August 2017 and in force since 13 June 2018, was invoked in November 2021 when Solomon Islands requested assistance following unrest in Honiara. The Interpreter reports that this agreement distributes authority among different institutions in ways that illustrate the complexity.
Under Article 4 of that agreement, visiting Australian police remain under national command, while the senior Australian police officer commands the Assisting Police Force. Members of that force may exercise the powers and privileges of members of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force, but they are not subject to local disciplinary rules or the jurisdiction of Solomon Islands disciplinary authorities, courts or tribunals.
Article 6 grants members of a Visiting Contingent immunity from arrest, detention and legal proceedings in Solomon Islands for acts performed in the course of, or incidental to, official duties. This protection applies to proceedings of a criminal, civil, disciplinary, administrative, and customary nature. Australia or any contributing third state can choose to lift the immunity for its own personnel, and the accord governs how those states exercise criminal and disciplinary authority. Under Article 22, third-party claims resulting from official actions that cause property damage, injury, or death are processed according to Solomon Islands law, covering evidence collection and the distribution of compensation expenses. The Interpreter notes that the lesson from this arrangement is not that such agreements are inappropriate, but that the authority to exercise police powers, operational command, disciplinary control, criminal jurisdiction and responsibility for compensation are distinct matters that should be settled before personnel are deployed.
Papua New Guinea's experience shows why these allocations need constitutional scrutiny. In May 2005, its Supreme Court considered the Enhanced Cooperation between Papua New Guinea and Australia Act 2004 in Special Reference by the Morobe Provincial Executive (SC785). According to The Interpreter, the Court unanimously found the immunity provisions unconstitutional, including the exclusion of the civil jurisdiction of Papua New Guinea's courts over acts done in the course of official duties. This led to the withdrawal of the Australian police contingent.
The decision did not reject international police assistance. It showed that arrangements allowing foreign personnel to exercise public authority must comply with the host state's constitution. Solomon Islands' constitutional framework is different, but Article 6 raises a comparable question: how can immunity serve legitimate operational purposes while still leaving an effective avenue for valid claims?
These examples matter as PACPOL moves from design to implementation. The Interpreter reports that a regional policing body is not a supranational police authority. PACPOL will be led by a single Chiefs Leadership Board providing strategic oversight, while the powers conferred on foreign personnel will continue to depend on specific deployment agreements.
Zakr proposes three principles for consideration. First, the legal basis and limits of cross-border deployments should be clearly established, with the powers of visiting personnel and their relationship with the host country's police and judicial institutions defined in advance. Second, operational command and legal accountability should be addressed separately, with agreements identifying the authorities responsible for investigating alleged misconduct, exercising criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction, and obtaining and sharing evidence. Third, individuals affected by the conduct of deployed personnel should have effective procedures for seeking redress, and immunities should not leave valid claims without a legal avenue.
The Interpreter notes that PACPOL is in a strong position to put these ideas into action. It might create example clauses for deployment pacts that address command, legal authority, evidence exchange, and compensation. Additionally, it could urge member nations to set up a regional mechanism for those impacted by the actions of deployed staff to submit grievances to the relevant domestic bodies. Such a system would honor national autonomy while boosting shared trust.
For university students studying international law, political science, or Pacific affairs, this story illustrates a real-world tension between operational effectiveness and legal accountability in cross-border policing. The PACPOL framework, and the bilateral agreements that will operate under it, will shape how future deployments are governed and how individuals affected by them can seek justice.